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1. Introduction 
In the interwar years, the difficulties of reinstating the gold standard and the disruptive 
shock of the Great Depression had prompted a wide-ranging debate on the international 
monetary system in the West. Today, the developments in the West, in particular the birth of 
euro and the Asian financial crisis were among the drivers which had spurred the 
proliferation of the intellectual work on monetary arrangement in the context of East Asia. 
The theory of optimum currency areas (OCAs) has advanced only minimally since the 
seminal contributions of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1963). It 
remains difficult to move from theory to empirical work and policy analysis.  
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997, p.762) 
Nevertheless, as the above statement vividly points out, it has remained difficult to 
operationalize the intellectual work to practical grounds given the complexities found in the 
real world. In spite of this, numerous empirical studies have attempted to demystify the 
theory in an effort to identify groups of economies which could possibly come together 
under one common monetary umbrella. 
Against this backdrop, the present paper seeks to present the reasons why the idea of Asian 
monetary union has gained increasing popularity despite of the obstacle highlighted. Along 
this line, the paper also provides the arguments for two alternative monetary anchors. 
Finally, the paper reviews a number of empirical works in the field in order to identify 
countries which have been commonly indicated to be prospective for integration and to 
comment on some general trends found in the empirical papers. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revisits the essence of the 
classical work which has propagated the intellectual framework. Section 3 explains why 
flexible exchange rates are most probably not suitable for emerging East Asia. Section 4 
details the case for fixed exchange rate and monetary union for the region. Sections 5 and 6 
present the case for US dollar and the case for currency basket as the monetary anchor 
respectively. Section 7 provides the review of 20 empirical studies and section 8 discusses 
relevant interpretations and concludes. 
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2. The theory of optimum currency areas 
In the classic published in 1961, Robert Mundell proposed that an optimal currency area is 
characterized by internal factor mobility and external factor immobility. Succinctly, 
interregional and interindustrial factor mobility can substitute for changes in nominal 
exchange rates to restore internal and external equilibriums when asymmetric shocks occur 
between economic regions. The equilibriums pertain to maintenance of full employment, 
stable price levels, and balanced international payments.  
Upon contemplation of Mundell’s thesis, Kenen (1969) elucidated the former’s definition 
of optimality and economic region. An economic region was interpreted as a 
homogeneous collection of producers that use the same technology, face the same 
demand curve, and suffer or prosper together as circumstances change whilst optimality 
was taken as a condition linked to the labor market and exchange rate regime. Economic 
regions do not necessarily coincide with nations. If a prevailing exchange rate regime can 
maintain external balance without causing unemployment or demand-induced wage 
inflation, that regime is optimal. Flexible prices, wage rates, and labor markets are the 
conditions underlying that optimality in which balances can be restored in the event of 
asymmetric shocks.  
Based on the presumption that perfect labor mobility hardly prevails, Kenen provided an 
alternative to define optimality. In his opinion, diversity in product-mix or economic 
activity may be more relevant than labor mobility in defining OCAs. He argued that well-
diversified economies are more able to cope with asymmetric shocks between members in a 
monetary union and are therefore more feasible candidates to be part of the union. Another 
dimension for optimality came from McKinnon (1963) in which he contended that highly 
open economies are least feasible for flexible exchange rates and hence, exchange rate 
fixation with a putative currency is highly desirable.  
Under fixed exchange rate and free capital mobility, the pursuit of independent monetary 
policy will likely lead to disequilibrium in the balance of payments, resulting in speculative 
capital flows (see e.g. Tavlas, 1993). In the presence of liberal capital sector, a sustainable 
monetary bloc entails irrevocably fixed exchange rates; full and irreversible convertibility of 
currencies; financial market integration; liberalized movements on current transactions; 
common monetary policy; and harmonization of national financial regulations and 
structures of institutions. 
3. The case against flexible exchange rate 
Even before the literature on OCAs came into the picture, there had always been a school of 
thought which advocates complete floating exchange rate. The fundamental argument 
raised by Milton Friedman1 in his 1953 classic for allowing exchange rate to float lies in the 
ability of floating rate to ease the process of adjustment to external shocks. Suppose the 
demand for exports of a country falls, necessitating a fall in relative prices of goods and 
labor to correct the deficit—it will be easier for the change in terms of trade be accomplished 
                                                 
1Though Friedman has always been portrayed as a strong advocate for floating rates, he has actually 
had no objections for hard fixed rates (Hanke, 2008). 
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through depreciation or devaluation rather than through some combinations of inflation in 
the foreign country and unemployment in the home country.  
Whilst the argument for floating rate is convincing, floating regime has nevertheless been 
criticized for increasing transaction costs, undermining the roles of money, and promoting 
speculation (Mundell, 1961); creating excess volatility and uncertainty which may lead to 
inconvertibility (Krugman, 1991); inflating prices and wages (McKinnon, 1963; Krugman, 
1990; Mundell, 2001); deterring international investment and capital allocation (Kenen, 1969; 
Tower and Willet, 1976; Eichengreen, 2001); facilitating precarious and inflationary 
monetary polices (McCallum, 1989; Tavlas, 1993; Calvo, 2002); disrupting international 
strategic management (Cooper, 2000); and also for its ineffectiveness in correcting balance of 
payments (De Grauwe, 1989; Krugman, 1990). 
In a strategic sense, attempts to increase competitiveness by devaluations would only lead 
to inflation and retaliations (see McKinnon, 1963; Krugman, 1990; Mundell, 2001). In 
highly open economies, domestic prices and wages are most likely closely linked to 
exchange rates of significant trading partners, rendering devaluations or depreciations 
ineffective in restoring external balance; the net result is more inflation. Also, devaluation 
is useless when a shock comes from the capital account, as when emerging markets are hit 
by contagion and face sharply higher interest rates; the Latin American and the 
Indonesian experience had been contractionary irrespective of the degree of devaluation 
(Calvo, 2002). 
In light of the above, for economies which have been integrated in respect of trade and 
international capital flows, which define most of East Asia today, flexible rates are most 
probably undesirable. In fact, the sharp fluctuations in the yen-dollar rate, coupled with 
pseudo-fixed or soft pegs and incompetent monetary policies were the main culprit behind 
the Asian crisis. Thus, the foregoing of independent monetary policy and hence floating rate 
is very likely to be beneficial to developing countries (Milton Friedman in Friedman and 
Mundell, 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  
This is in light of the fact that even Japan, an advanced economy, is not spared from the 
devastating effects from floating rates. The Japanese banking system was the casualty of 
excessive appreciation of the yen between 1985 and 1995 (Mundell, 2003). The tripling of the 
value of the yen against the dollar had actually weakened the corporate balance sheets and 
saddled the Japanese banking system with non-performing loans. 
4. The case for fixed exchange rate and monetary union 
The primary case in favor of exchange rate fixation against a pivotal currency rests upon the 
desirability of certainty (Krugman, 1990). By fixing participants’ currency values against a 
hard currency (or a basket of hard currencies), the resulted system will confer a degree of 
stability between the participants and the numéraire country (countries), as well as between 
the participants. The desirability of fixed exchange rate and monetary union is evidently 
proven by the ever-expanding EMU; the Euro club contains 16 members since Slovakia 
adopted the Euro on January 1, 2009. The following discussion highlights the case for an 
Asian monetary union which most probably underlies the motivation for the empirical 
studies in the area.  
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Greater economic integration 
Tighter economic integration in East Asia is ever warranted in the face of rising regional 
integration elsewhere such as NAFTA, EU, Mercosur, CEMAC2, OECS3, UEMOA4, and 
CACM5. To an extent, these arrangements have brought intra-regional stability but more 
competition between trade blocs and more volatility between major currencies.  
Along these lines, East Asia may need to further enhance its intra-regional trade to 
insulate against disturbances originating from outside the region. Recent free trade deals 
have encompassed ASEAN6, China, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand which 
cover aspects of goods, services, investments, and intellectual property (Kowsmann and 
Venkat, 2008). In theory, countries could still achieve greater economic integration 
through regional free trade arrangements without monetary integration (Ngiam and 
Yuen, 2001). In practice, however, trade liberalization and economic integration often 
require stable exchange rates. Otherwise, regional free trade agreements could be 
undermined by compensatory tariffs demanded by exporters in stable countries against 
countries that might devalue their currencies. In effect, during the interwar experience, 
nations had resorted to either exchange rate manipulation or tariff protection to maintain 
competitiveness (see Simmons, 1994).  
On the other hand, a monetary union which encourages trade and economic integration 
constitutes a virtuous self-reinforcing circle (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997). If a world 
currency is set as the anchor currency, firms need not incur hedging costs and lose trade 
from uncertainty, not only with union countries but also with the rest of the world (see 
Krugman, 1990). Since EMU was established, trade and investment have grown 
tremendously and the monetary area has expanded to embrace more peripheral countries. 
The same is true for the case of dollarization, an effective monetary union with the US, 
which has raised investment and economic growth (Alesina and Barro, 2001) and trade 
enormously (Rose and van-Wincoop, 2001).  
Highly open economies would gain much if exchange rates are fixed. When initial trade is 
large, the size of required price and wage adjustments to accommodate any given external 
shock will be small (Krugman, 1990). With initial exports of 20 percent of GNP, a one 
percent deficit (of GNP) would require less fall in prices and wages than if the initial exports 
were one percent. Even when initial trade is low, the gains from fixed rates could also be 
high (Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro, 2002). Since low initial trade could be due to high 
trading costs, the trade that did occur must have high marginal values— coupled with lower 
marginal costs when exchange rates are fixed, higher marginal gains will result. 
In view of the above, a monetary bloc would be extremely advantageous to East Asia which 
has been enjoying increasingly high intra-regional trade and trade integration with the rest 
of the world, led by the export juggernauts of China, India, and the Asian Tigers.  
                                                 
2 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. 
3 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. 
4 West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
5 Central American Common Market. 
6 To date, ASEAN contains Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei in addition to the original 
members of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Phillippines. 
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The benefits are especially important to the highly heterogeneous economic structure of the 
region (Ngiam and Yuen, 2001). All the while, MNCs operating in the region have to 
diversify their production processes and stages of production across countries to exploit 
comparative advantages. Examples are the tourism and electronics industries which are 
highly concentrated in the growth triangles (GTs) in Southeast Asia. GTs are subregional 
economic zones which were set up to foster economic complementation (Ramos, 1994). The 
first triangle was the Singapore-Johor-Riau Triangle (SIJORI) initiated in 1988 where R&D 
and capital intensive jobs are done in Singapore while labor intensive and manufacturing 
jobs are located in Johor and Riau. It later became the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore 
Triangle (IMS-GT) in 1994. Other triangles are the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) 
covering Brunei and parts of Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia; a growth zone linking 
parts of Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and China; and the southern Chinese Economic Triangle, 
made up of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan which began with Deng Xiaoping's vision of 
substituting economic development for class warfare as the highest order of business in 
post-Mao China.  
A monetary bloc which bolsters economic integration will also preclude any undesirable 
beggar-thy-neighbor policy. Even the implicit dollar peg (or pseudo-exchange rate union) 
adopted by the Asian economies prior to the Asian crisis had actually insulated each other 
from harmful devaluations (McKinnon, 2005). In spite of this, past experience has shown 
that beggar-thy-neighbor policies could still be a concern. For instance, even though there 
was no speculative attack against the Singapore dollar during the Asian crisis, the Singapore 
government had nevertheless allowed its currency to fall against the dollar in line with the 
regional currencies in an attempt to preserve its competitiveness (Ngiam and Yuen, 2001).  
Lower costs 
A currency area enhances the role of money as unit of account by setting economies of scale 
into play and reduces transaction costs, including the costs of information, search, exchange, 
hedging, and calculation (Grubel, 1981). Small economies, including the less developed 
economies in Indo-China in East Asia, should benefit the most from the unit of account, 
means of payment, and store of value services provided by a major currency (see  Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen, 1997). In fact, the US dollar has been commonly accepted in Vietnam and 
its neighboring countries since the Vietnam War. 
A credible monetary union anchored on a stable currency will also lead to lower cost of 
capital (see McKinnon and Pill, 1999; Chang, 2000). Since the uncertainty arisen from 
currency risk and sudden regime change is removed in this arrangement, the cost of 
international and hence domestic borrowing becomes lower. In addition, the improved 
allocational efficiency of financing process in a monetary bloc does provide both borrowers 
and lenders a broader spectrum of financial instruments, thereby enabling more efficient 
choices to be made in terms of duration and risk (Robson, 1987). 
Lower cost of capital also stems from lower reserve requirement when enlargement of 
foreign exchange market in a monetary bloc removes volatility of exchange rates and ability 
of speculators to influence money prices (Grubel, 1970; Fleming, 1971; Tower and Willet, 
1976). Moreover, if countries are structurally diverse, as those in East Asia, reserves for 
intra-area transactions too may be substantially reduced because any payments imbalances 
may be offsetting (see Kafka, 1969). 
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Price stability 
A monetary standard based on a credible currency also helps in curbing inflation in several 
ways. First, exchange rate fixation facilitates inflation targeting. As Giovannetti (1992) 
argued, exchange-rate targeting is better than monetary-growth targeting because exchange 
rates are highly observable whereas money supply, to the extent that it is endogenous, is 
difficult to measure and control. Second, any high inflation country which joins a low 
inflation monetary bloc could ‘import’ low inflation reputation without loss of output and 
employment (De Grauwe, 1992). The recent past has seen establishments of currency board 
intended to import monetary policy credibility from a stable developed country (Oomes and 
Meissner, 2008).7 Third, collusion in the form of fixed exchange rates can remove internal 
monetary policy from politically dependent domestic authorities and delegate it to a more 
independent foreign authority (Fratianni and von Hagen, 1992). 
Evidence of fixed exchange rate and inflation reduction can be seen from countries that have 
implemented rigid rates. Historically, countries with currency boards (e.g., Argentina, 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria) have experienced lower inflation and higher growth than 
those with other regimes (Guide, Kähkönen, and Keller, 2000). While Chang (2000) has 
found that dollarization had enhanced the credibility of policies in curbing inflation, 
Edwards and Magendzo (2001), and Dornbusch (2001) have detected that dollarized 
countries tend to display significantly lower levels of inflation than their non-dollarized 
counterparts. 
Monetary credibility and inflation reduction are also important to less developed countries 
in East Asia. In general, the degree of monetary authority independence from the executive 
branch in these countries is far lower than those in the advanced countries, which partly 
explains why internal monetary policies in small countries are relatively unstable. Based on 
IMF data, average CPI inflation in Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia for 2001-2007 is about 4-6 
percent higher than the US level while Myanmar’s rate is about 24 percent higher. Since 
there is no permanent Phillips curve trade-off  (see e.g., Tavlas, 1993), high inflation 
countries have little to lose in the long run and much to gain by adopting monetary policy of 
a stable country. In this respect, the US would be one of the possible anchor countries since 
the US internal prices have been very stable since the early 1980s (McKinnon, 2005).  
Financial stability 
Rigid pegs to a hard currency are particularly advantageous to substantially indebted 
countries with soft currencies. A stable domestic currency against the denominator of 
liabilities is utmost crucial in times of distress where speculative capital flows could easily 
deplete foreign reserves even among neighboring countries that are marginally leveraged. 
Given that many developing countries in East Asia are still substantially indebted in hard 
currencies especially in dollars (Calvo, 2002; McKinnon, 2000), any steep depreciations 
would certainly render them insolvent. This might in turn push the debtor countries into a 
vicious cycle of capital reversals and further depreciations (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 
2003). The Thai experience during the Asian crisis is a very good instance. 
                                                 
7 New currency boards have been implemented in Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Djibouti, Estonia, and Lithuania. Examples of currency blocs in small economies are the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Union and the CFA franc zone in Africa. 
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Though IMF usually advises countries to float their exchange rates in face of domestic crises, 
emerging middle-income economies are held back by the so-called “fear of floating” 
dilemma (see  e.g., Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). At least two interlocking factors underlie this 
‘fear’. First, emerging economies do not have well-developed and diversified financial 
systems which are able to minimize real sector disruptions resulted from transitory 
exchange rate variations. Most importantly, they are not able to borrow overseas in their 
domestic currencies, commonly referred to as “original sin”. Second, policymakers in 
emerging markets suffer from a chronic lack of credibility. As a result, an emerging 
economy might experience large and frequent shocks to exchange rate expectations or to 
interest rate risk premiums. By right, a true floater would allow the spot exchange rate to 
absorb these shocks. However, due to original sin and the need to maintain credibility, these 
countries allow for some flexibility in both variables, but by and large it is the interest rate 
that absorbs most of the shock.  
Labor mobility 
According to Mundell (1961), the costs of sacrificing the use of exchange rate changes would 
be minimal if there is mobility or flexibility of the labor markets in geographical and 
industrial dimensions within a currency area (see also, Lerner, 1944). Alternatively, if labor 
markets are flexible, real wages can adjust to restore internal and external balances. In 
considerations for monetary union, this issue plays the center role because it concerns about 
welfare and employment. The following evidence suggests that labor markets in East Asia 
may be sufficiently mobile or flexible to withstand asymmetric disturbances that may arise 
in a monetary union. 
Asis and Piper (2008) discovered that much of international migration in Asia is intra-
regional and undocumented. Also, the migration industry is well developed and well 
connected. Since early 2000s, the world's largest net labor exporting country is the 
Philippines. Other main exporters include Indonesia, India, China, Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Cambodia, and Laos. The common destinations for them are Middle East, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. Net labor importing countries include Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, 
Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand, which draw workers from the less developed 
countries in the region. Notably, China allowed labor export mostly in connection with state 
contracted projects overseas since the 1978 market reform but international migration has 
been eclipsed by the much larger internal rural-to-urban migration.  
At the same time, Athukorala (2006) found that the number of migrant workers per 1,000 of 
labor force has increased significantly from 1980s to early 2000s in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The number has continued to rise in 
Malaysia and Korea despite the Asian crisis and in Japan despite its decade-long recession. 
Remarkably, the stock of foreign workers in Japan has recorded an almost three-fold 
increase from 1990 to 2003. In particular, Manning (2000) discovered that unskilled, skilled, 
professional, and business migration in East Asia had intensified in the 1990s and continued 
even in the face of Asian crisis. Indeed, intra-Asian labor migration had increased 
approximately from 1 million in the beginning of 1980s to 6.5 million in 2002 (Huang and 
Guo, 2006). One possible reason would be the establishment of ASEAN Occupational Safety 
and Health Network in 2001.  
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Goto and Hamada (1994) and Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) have even indicated that 
labor mobility in East Asia was higher than that in Western Europe during the 1980s and 
1990s. In 1999, the year the euro was adopted, ten countries in Western Europe had some 
kind of minimum wage policy whereas only four East Asian economies had that kind of 
policy, suggesting that Asian wages could be relatively easily adjusted to clear the labor 
market (Ngiam and Yuen, 2001). For that year, the unemployment rates in East Asia were 
also found to be lower than those in Western Europe.  
5. The case for US dollar as the anchor 
The big news last week was a speech by Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of China’s 
central bank, calling for a new “super-sovereign reserve currency”. 
But they are, apparently, worried about the fact that around 70 percent of those (the 
China’s) assets are dollar-denominated, so any future fall in the dollar would mean a 
big capital loss for China. 
(Krugman, 2009) 
The above excerpt is from Paul Krugman’s New York Times column published in April, 
2009. The article responded to China’s call to replace the US dollar as the world reserve 
currency in wake of the 2008 global economic crisis “exported” by the US. Notwithstanding 
the “flaw” in the US monetary policy and financial sector, the article asserted that the dollar 
would remain robust in view of the fact that any dollar dumping by China would set 
downward pressures on the dollar, leading to huge capital loss for the republic. 
This is clearly reflected in Table 1 which exhibits the currency composition of official 
currency reserves in the world and in the emerging and developing economies. Due to 
confidentiality of data, data for individual countries are not available publicly. Despite its 
declining share, the US dollar is still the most dominant reserve currency till 2008. One can 
also notice the decreasing role of the yen and the rising dominance of the euro. 
Krugman’s argument appears to be consistent with the proposal by the OCA gurus, Robert 
Mundell and Ronald McKinnon on having a dollar bloc in East Asia (see e.g., Mundell, 2003; 
McKinnon, 2005). Mundell has explicitly recommended that US dollar be the anchor 
currency for ASEAN+3 countries as the initial step toward an Asian monetary union. The 
most devastating threat to an Asian dollar bloc, however, is the floating yen-dollar rate 
which may be chaotic when it swings sharply. But then again, should Japan is also a part of 
the dollar bloc, this setback virtually disappears. 
Several other factors have also made the choice of the US dollar as the monetary anchor an 
ideal one. First, as widely recognized, the dollar is the vehicle currency for transaction 
across the world. Specifically, exports of primary products tend to be invoiced in dollars 
with worldwide price formation (spot and forward) in centralized exchanges usually in US 
cities like Chicago and New York, and in dollar-denominated commodity exchanges in 
London and elsewhere (McKinnon, 2000). 
In East Asia, the dollar is also the preferred invoice currency even though Japanese trade is 
as large as the American one (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004). Only about half of Japan’s 
overall exports are invoiced in yen, while three quarters of its imports are invoiced in dollars. 
When the yen-dollar rate fluctuates, Japan will suffer high variation in domestic  
www.intechopen.com
 
The Case for Monetary Union in East Asia – From Theory to Empirics 
 
245 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
World    
USD 59 62 65 69 71 71 72 67 66 66 67 65 64 64 
Pound 
sterling 
2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 
Deutsche 
mark 
16 15 14 14 - - - - - - - - - - 
French 
francs 
2 2 1 2 - - - - - - - - - - 
Japanese 
yen 
7 7 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 
Swiss 
francs 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherland
s guilder 
0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
ECUs 9 7 6 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
Euros - - - - 18 18 19 24 25 25 24 25 26 27 
Others 5 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Emerging and developing 
economies 
   
USD 72 73 74 73 72 73 72 66 61 61 62 61 61 60 
Pound 
sterling 
2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 5 6 6 5 
Deutsche 
mark 
15 15 14 14 - - - - - - - - - - 
French 
francs 
2 2 2 2 - - - - - - - - - - 
Japanese 
yen 
6 5 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Swiss 
francs 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherland
s guilder 
0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
ECUs 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
Euros - - - - 19 20 22 28 32 31 30 31 30 31 
Others 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 
Source: (COFER), IMF (2009). 
Table 1. Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (Percent) 
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prices of goods, that is, “pass-through” is high. Other East Asian countries are equally 
vulnerable. On the other hand, the US price level is fairly immune to fluctuations in the 
dollar rate because both its exports and imports are largely invoiced in dollars. In periods of 
reasonable confidence in the US monetary policy, commodity prices in dollar are relatively 
invariant to fluctuations in dollar rate.  
Second, the US is also the most important export destination for most East Asian countries. 
Based on 1990–2002 data, Kawai and Takagi (2005) showed that the US was by far the most 
important industrial-country destination for principal Asian exporters, such as Cambodia, 
the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, China, and Singapore, 
although Japan was more important for Vietnam and the resource exporting countries of 
Brunei and Indonesia. As for imports, Japan was the most important source country, except 
in Brunei and Cambodia for which the EU was the most important. Based on direction of 
trade data from IMF for 2001-2007, total trade with the US (exports plus imports) is higher 
than that with Japan for China, Hong Kong, Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Vietnam, India, Macau whereas total trade with Japan is higher for Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Brunei.  
Other than direct relationship with US, trade with dollar bloc countries in Asia Pacific is 
significant too. As Kawai and Akiyama (2000) pointed out, it is possible that the ‘excess’ 
stability of East Asian currencies against the US dollar beyond what can be explained by 
bilateral linkage, is accounted for by the importance of trade with other countries in the 
dollar bloc. This is because it is “optimal” for a country to adopt an anchor currency that 
minimizes the sum of bilateral exchange rate volatilities, weighted by the importance of 
each trade partner (Oomes and Meissner, 2008). Other than in Asia, the dollar is also the 
international standard for invoicing goods and services and for denominating the bulk of 
international capital flows in the Americas, the Oceania, and much of Africa (McKinnon, 
2005). 
Third, American corporations have been playing a significant role in foreign direct 
investment in East Asia. In this aspect, the importance of dollar can be recognized by 
looking at the regional breakdown of FDI inflows into the region (see Kawai and Takagi, 
2005). For newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), 
about 23 percent of total FDI inflows during 1990–2002 came from the US, about 15 percent 
from the EU, and about 14 percent from Japan. For ASEAN (excluding Singapore), 22 
percent of the inflows came from Japan, while 18 percent and 16 percent came from EU and 
the US respectively. In China, the US accounted for 10 percent of the total FDI inflows, while 
EU and Japan accounted for 8 percent and 6 percent respectively. 
Fourth, a regional dollar bloc could certainly bolster dollar-pegging durability of any 
individual country. This is in view of the fact that soft pegs against the dollar are still 
strong and prevalent in East Asia in spite of the Asian crisis (McKinnon, 2005; McKinnon 
and Schnabl, 2004; Ogawa and Shimizu, 2006; Bauer and Herz, 2009).8 In South Asia, India 
                                                 
8 According to Ogawa and Shimizu (2006), the Chinese yuan, the Malaysian ringgit, the Cambodian riel, 
the Lao kip, the Myanmar kyat, and the Vietnamese dong had still maintained their dollar pegs in 2004 
and 2005. Meanwhile, the Singaporean dollar, the Japanese yen, the Thailand baht, the Korean won, the 
Indonesian rupiah, and the Philippine peso, had about two-thirds of their currency basket weights on 
the dollar.  
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has been adopting a de facto dollar peg since 1993 which continued even after the crisis 
(see Patnaik and Shah, 2008). Even though many Asian exporters have turned around 
from being net capital debtors to net creditors against the US after the crisis, many still opt 
to maintain their soft dollar pegs because any currency depreciation will reduce the value 
of their dollar-denominated assets and increase the value of outstanding external debt 
and debt service payments whereas any revaluation would certainly impede their export 
competitiveness—an impasse duly labeled as “conflicted virtue”. Furthermore, many 
poor developing countries in Asia still have high levels of dollarization and indexation of 
debt (Rogoff, 2005). The prevalent pegging will most like stay because when a large 
number of countries are pegging to a currency, it becomes difficult to break out of this 
pattern into another perhaps more socially beneficial set of arrangements (see Oomes and 
Meissner, 2008). Since this is the case, a step forward to an Asian dollar bloc is absolutely 
logical. 
Since the days before the Asian crisis, most Asian economies had informally soft-pegged 
their currencies to the dollar, a move which made them vulnerable to the depreciating yen. 
However, dollar pegs were entirely rational from the perspective of Asian economies—to 
facilitate hedging by merchants and banks against exchange risks, and to help central banks 
anchor their domestic price levels. Nevertheless, since their dollar pegs were ‘soft’, the 
obvious Achilles heel was the vulnerability to one-way speculation which struck during the 
crisis. In contrary, if their exchange rates were securely locked to the dollar with credible 
regional arrangements, the system as a whole would definitely be durable.  
Fifth, the dollar is also the ‘safe-haven’ currency into which nationals in emerging markets 
fly in the face of a domestic financial crisis (McKinnon, 1999). Even when the US money 
manager, the Federal Reserve System, had been doing quite badly, as happened from the 
inflationary 1970s into the early 1980s, the dollar-based system proved surprisingly resilient. 
The resilient dollar rate even in the midst of the recent global financial crisis is another 
evidence. In the absence of any serious shock to the US monetary system, for any country in 
East Asia, the more synchronized its monetary policy with the US one (i.e., dollar exchange 
rate naturally stable and price level aligned with the US level), the lower will be the 
currency risk (e.g., from capital flight). 
Sixth, anchoring domestic currencies against the multi-faceted dollar may also yield 
synergistic benefits. Since World War I, the dollar had emerged as the world’s currency 
which has remained as the predominant global unit of value, the unit of quotations for 
exchange rates (both spot and forward markets), the main invoice currency, the dominant 
international reserve medium (and official intervention currency), the de facto unit of 
account for IMF transactions, and the international currency of choice for investors, 
travelers, and even smugglers and other illicit transactions (Mundell, 2007). The extract from 
Paul Krugman’s comment in the beginning of this section clearly highlights this point. Since 
financial liberalization, which has been progressing in the Asian region, would lead to more 
global integration (Lee, Park, and Shin, 2004), the choice of a global currency, that is, the 
dollar would be most appropriate. 
Lastly, other candidate currencies may not be suitable enough to serve as the monetary 
anchor for East Asia. Though Japan’s influence in the region is undeniably significant, due 
to some considerations, the Japanese yen may not be the ideal numéraire.  
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First, as pointed out by Mundell (2003), Japan has been facing internal macroeconomic and 
banking problems and its yen had been very unstable against the dollar. The tripling of the 
yen’s value against the dollar between 1985 and 1995 weakened corporate balance sheets 
and saddled the Japanese banking system with trillions of non-performing loans. Had Japan 
locked its yen’s rate to the dollar, prolonged stability in the yen-dollar rate would have 
quashed the resulted deflationary expectations that had gripped the Japanese economy for 
almost a decade (McKinnon, 2005).  
Second, as mentioned before, because a large part of Japanese trade is invoiced in dollars, 
any changes in the yen-dollar rate would be passed through to domestic yen prices. This 
makes the Japanese domestic price levels vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations.  
Third, as Shirono (2009) and Kwan (1998) have discovered, besides the declining 
dependence on Japan, the economic structure and the inflation level of Asian economies 
which were significantly different from those of Japan would certainly be a great deterrent 
to a yen bloc. At the same time, Sato, Zhang, and McAleer (2003) and Chow and Kim (2003) 
have found that Japanese real business cycle was significantly different from those in the 
region. Other difficulties with the use of the yen are associated with the unfamiliarity with 
the Japanese language and emotional issues associated with acknowledgement of Japan’s 
culpability in World War II (Mundell, 2003). Perhaps for the above reasons, there has been 
no Japanese yen bloc in the world (see Oomes and Meissner, 2008). Another possible reason 
is the Japanese de facto dollar peg in 1949–1977 and tight regulation which existed in the 
Tokyo financial market until the end of the 1980s which had simply promoted the rise of the 
dollar in Asia.9   
Fourth, as shown in Table 1, the importance of the Japanese yen in official foreign exchange 
reserves in the world and in emerging and developing economies has been declining 
steadily. This indirectly indicates the declining role of the yen in international transaction 
and store of value. 
What about the possibility of the Chinese renminbi as the anchor? At present, the China’s 
currency is not convertible on capital account, and its financial system is not well developed 
(Mundell, 2003). Of course, keeping foreign reserves in the form of Chinese government 
assets would not be perceived as risk-free as putting them in Japanese government bonds or 
US treasury bills. The fact that China places 70 percent of its savings in the US is a good 
evidence.  
In addition, the choice of an internal anchor, yen or renminbi, could be a source of distrust 
between rivals. As aptly put it by Katada (2008), despite emerging signs of challenges, 
Japan's domestic resistance and the region's power rivalry between Japan and China still 
makes the dollar the currency of choice in the medium term future.  
                                                 
9 Japan maintained a parity of 1 dollar = 360 yen from April 1949 to August 1971. Reasons why Japan 
preferred the dollar to the British pound were the US economic aid during the reconstruction period 
and the windfall demands of the Korean War which promoted dollar transactions whilst at the same 
time, sterling had the disadvantage of nonconvertibility (Oomes and Meissner, 2008). Thereafter, the 
dollar stabilized its position as the key currency for Japan because coincidentally trade in dollars also 
increased its share in the Asian region while at the same time trade finance in the New York money 
market became more important (Iwami, 1994). 
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6. The case for currency basket as an alternative 
Though the case for dollar is well demonstrated, current developments particularly the 
recent global financial crisis has nevertheless made the option of a currency basket 
arrangement for East Asia more appealing.  
On July 21, 2005, the China’s government announced that the monetary authority would 
adopt a managed floating exchange rate system with reference to a currency basket. In 
recent years, so too have some East Asian countries, namely Singapore, Thailand, Japan, 
Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Kawai, 2008).  
In the literature, Kawai and Akiyama (2000), Ogawa and Ito (2002), and Williamson (2005) 
were among the vocal advocates which suggested that East Asia adopts a common currency 
basket in order to stabilize intra-regional exchange rates and at the same time allow both 
misalignment among intra-regional currencies and volatility vis-à-vis the outside currencies, 
including the dollar and the euro, to be restrained. 
Under a common currency basket, the monetary authorities of the East Asian countries use 
the value of a basket of major international currencies (i.e., the US dollar, yen, and euro) as a 
reference to make regional coordination in exchange rate policies so as to not deviate each of 
the Asian currencies from the common reference (Ogawa and Shimizu, 2006). Such an 
arrangement can be called a G-3 currency basket. The most apparent benefit of the G-3 
currency basket (with optimal weights) is that it keeps trade competitiveness relatively 
stable because real effective exchange rates would be more stable against large shocks to 
their trade balances. On the other hand, a common US dollar (hard) peg could possibly 
deviate their effective exchange rates from desirable levels because Asian economies have 
strong economic relationships with not only the US but also Japan and the EU (Kawai and 
Akiyama, 2000; Kawai, 2008). 
What about individual currency basket? An individual currency basket is composed of its 
own trade partner currencies based on its own trade weights (Ogawa and Shimizu, 2006). 
Too much variety within an individual currency basket composition would have adverse 
effects on stability of intra-regional exchange rates if the monetary authorities target the 
individual currency baskets.  
Empirically, Williamson (2005) managed to demonstrate the superior performance of a 
common currency basket over a series of individual currency baskets. The common 
currency basket was found to be able to reduce instability of intra-regional exchange rates. 
As Rajan (2002) pointed out, a common currency basket would be more favorable than 
individual currency baskets because the possibility of a competitive devaluation would exist 
if national monetary authorities can choose their own individual currency baskets.  
Notwithstanding the popularity of a common currency basket, it will only work in practice 
if the yen-dollar and dollar-euro rates were stable (see Mundell, 2003). Along this argument, 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) raised two other important reasons why an East Asian dollar 
bloc is favorable to a common currency basket bloc. 
First, exchange rate fixation to just one pivotal currency helps individual merchants and 
bankers better hedge their own foreign exchange risks. Because of the missing bond and 
forward exchange markets in many developing countries in Asia, governments would provide 
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an informal hedge by keeping the domestic currency stable against the dominant currency (the 
dollar). Suppose Japan is part of an East Asian dollar bloc, this would leave merchants to the 
‘extraneous’ fluctuations in the dollar-euro rate which, however, can be hedged by making use 
of well-developed forward market between dollar and euro. On the other hand, under a 
currency basket, merchant’s hedging strategy would be confused10, particularly if the weights 
of the major currencies in the basket are somewhat vague, and the timing of official changes in 
the rate between national currency and the dollar (intervention currency that governments 
use) is also uncertain. Basket pegging would reduce risk only if merchants could not hedge. 
However, almost all merchants today use forward hedging strategies.  
Second, picking the appropriate official weights in a common currency basket is extremely 
problematic. A simple trade-weighted basket would not reflect the dollar’s overwhelming 
predominance as a currency of invoice, where external dollar prices of goods and services 
are sticky and do not vary much with changes in the dollar-euro rate. Nor, would it reflect 
the currency of denomination of outstanding external debts. As Kenen and Meade (2008) 
added, no simple set of trade weights will give optimal results because optimality itself is a 
multi-dimensional notion, and no one really knows enough about the relevant parameters to 
modify the trade weights in a satisfactory way. In the East Asian context, Korea trades far 
more heavily with Japan than do most ASEAN countries. Within ASEAN, Indonesia and 
Thailand trade more heavily with Japan than with US whereas Singapore trades more 
heavily with US. 
7. Empirical review 
The most common method used in empirical Asian OCA literature, probably due the 
precedence set by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), is the structural vector-autoregression 
(SVAR) approach. In a nutshell, the VAR approach attempts to identify most homogenous 
countries so that costs associated to monetary union participation can be minimized. If the 
responses of certain variables (e.g., price, real exchange rate, unemployment, etc.) to some 
macroeconomic shocks (e.g., demand and supply shocks) are symmetrical in terms of 
magnitude, pattern, and speed of adjustment, the costs of forming a monetary bloc would 
be presumably small. Other strands of methodologies have strived to achieve similar 
objective, that is, identification of homogeneous groups.  
Of the 20 papers dated 1994–2009 reviewed, some studies have indicated relatively broad 
integration comprising four or more countries in a group whereas others have suggested 
smaller groups as potential candidates. The studies can be categorized into those which use 
dataset prior to the Asian crisis in which the region was experiencing remarkable growth 
(pre-1997 dataset), those which also include the crisis period (pre-2000 dataset), and those 
which extend the dataset till the post-crisis period (pre-2008) but before the 2008 global 
financial crisis. While some studies have investigated multiple aspects of convergence, only 
results from the main econometric analysis are extracted. 
Pre-1997 dataset 
In their 1994 much celebrated piece, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (B-E) compared 9 East 
Asian countries to Western Europe, by asking whether Asia came as close as Europe to 
                                                 
10 A clear illustration is given in McKinnon and Schnabl (2004). 
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being an OCA. 1969–1989 data and Blanchard-Quah (B-Q) extraction technique were used 
to extract and quantify demand and supply shocks that affect a country’s economy. The 
higher the correlation between the shocks of a pair of countries, the stronger the economic 
integration. They also asked how rapidly each country individually adjusted to each type 
of shock.  
The number of large positive correlations expressed as a percentage of the total country 
pairs in Asia exceeded the corresponding percentage in EU. Asian countries also adjusted 
more rapidly to both types of shocks than did the EU countries. Accordingly, they 
concluded that East Asia came as close as the EU to being an OCA, and specifically two 
country subsets came even closer to being OCAs: (1) a Northeast Asian bloc comprising 
Japan-Korea-Taiwan, and (2) a Southeast Asian bloc comprising Hong Kong-Indonesia-
Malaysia-Singapore, and possibly Thailand.  
Later in 1999, Eichengreen and Bayoumi complemented their earlier results by regressing 
bilateral exchange rate volatility on relative output variability, dissimilarity of export 
composition, strength of bilateral trade, and economic size. Time period used was 1976–1995 
and 8 Asian countries were included. The simulated levels of exchange rate variability in 
East Asia had been found to approach the Western European levels. Specifically, three 
country groups have displayed significant correlation in exchange rate variability: (1) 
Singapore-Malaysia, (2) Singapore-Thailand, and (3) Singapore-Hong Kong-Taiwan. 
Another support based on pre-crisis data came from Loayza, Lopez, and Ubide (2001) which 
utilized 1970–1994 data of 7 Asian economies to present evidence from an error components 
model. The shock dimensions examined were country-specific, sector-specific, and common 
shocks. The study discovered significant short-run and long-run co-movements of shocks 
within East Asia which were comparable to those found within Europe. Specifically, two 
potential country groups were identified: (1) Japan-Korea-Singapore-Taiwan, and (2) 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand. 
Pre-2000 dataset 
In 2000, Yuen used GDP per capita, real GDP growth, aggregate price inflation, deposit 
interest rates, gross domestic investment, value-added in agriculture, and value-added in 
services with hierarchical clustering to identify prospective East Asian countries for 
monetary union. 1990–1997 data were used and Asian countries made up 9 of the total cases. 
The results suggested five country groups: (1) a mature group of Japan-Australia-New 
Zealand-US (high income per capita, low GDP growth, moderate inflation), (2) a high 
growth group of Korea-Malaysia-Thailand (income per head, inflation, interest rates), (3) a 
moderate growth group of Indonesia-Philippines (moderate growth, low income per capita, 
and high inflation), (4) a small open economy group of Hong Kong-Singapore (highest 
income per capita, lowest interest rates, highest value-added in services, lowest value-added 
in agriculture), and (5) China which was distinctly different from the rest. 
In a 2001 paper, Bayoumi and Mauro updated the earlier B-E work with a larger dataset of 
1968–1998 which includes the crisis period. As before, 9 Asian countries were examined. 
They concluded that the size of disturbances in East Asia was larger than that in EMU, 
reflecting the situation during the Asian crisis. Nevertheless, perhaps due to higher 
domestic labor flexibility, the speed of adjustment in East Asia was faster than that in EMU. 
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They identified two country sets which displayed faster speed of adjustment from supply 
shocks: (1) Hong Kong-Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore and (2) Philippines-Thailand.11  
Adopting B-E methodology, Ngiam and Yuen (2001) used 1967–1997 dataset and included 9 
countries. The study however did not use impulse response function and EMU as 
benchmark. Considering VAR results with geographic proximity and social-cultural 
compatibility, they proposed three plausible monetary unions: (1) Brunei-Singapore-
Malaysia, (2) Japan-Korea, and (3) Taiwan-Hong Kong.  
Lee, Park, and Shin (2004) also discovered some strong support for monetary integration in 
East Asia based on 1978–1999 data and 10 Asian economies. Based on a dynamic factor 
model, the region’s common shocks in 1990s were found to be at least comparable to those 
in Europe. In particular, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines shared 
higher degree of regional output co-movements.  
Kawai and Takagi (2005) applied a variation of SVAR model to study the impulse response 
patterns of real GDP and price to exchange rate depreciations among 9 East Asian 
economies. Time period under review is 1970–1998. Symmetry of response pattern in real 
GDP could be found in ‘non-crisis’ economies of (1) China-Hong Kong-Singapore-Taiwan 
and ‘crisis’ economies of (2) Indonesia-Korea-Philippines-Thailand. With respect to 
symmetric response pattern in price, the symmetric groups were: (1) China-Hong-Kong-
Singapore-Taiwan-Korea and (2) Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines. 
Pre-2008 dataset 
Stretching the time period to cover the post-crisis Asia, Kawai and Motonishi (2005) used 
1980–2002 data of 11 Asian economies to demonstrate that real activity variables, namely 
growth rates of real GDP, real personal consumption, and real fixed investment, were highly 
correlated among Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand with Indonesia 
and the Philippines beginning to join this group. Nevertheless, real activity variables of 
China and low-income ASEAN members were not highly correlated with those of other 
Asian economies. 
While most studies do not specify any reference country, Font-Vilalta and Costa-Font (2006) 
set Japan as the monetary anchor for 5 countries studied. In this correlation-based paper 
which utilized 1963–2001 data for Asian countries, the authors examined synchronization of 
exchange rates, business cycles, interest rates, exports, and imports to assess the feasibility of 
a yen bloc. To explore the pattern of convergence across different economic conditions, a 
multi-period analysis across three periods, 1963–1979, 1980–1997, and 1997–2001 was carried 
out.12 Only Singapore and Korea have been found to experience increasing synchronization 
in terms of the dimensions examined.  
Complementing VAR approach with generalized purchasing power parity (GPPP) 13 model 
and using real exchange rates with Japan as the basis, Ahn, Kim, and Chang (2006) managed 
                                                 
11 Demand shocks were not examined in this paper as they were thought to be unlikely to be invariant 
to demand management policies and currency regimes. 
12 This non-overlapping multi- period analysis which is common in applied economics is also used in 
the present paper. 
13 Long-run purchasing power parity (PPP) implies that real exchange rates are stationary. A vast literature 
has, however, shown that they are nonstationary. This is because fundamental macroeconomic variables 
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to find ASEAN 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand), Hong Kong, Korea, and 
Taiwan to qualify for an OCA with respect to significant symmetrical response to supply 
shocks in terms of magnitude and speed of adjustment. Besides, ASEAN 4, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan were shown to share common trends in real exchange rate 
movement. Time periods used were 1960–2002 (SVAR) and 1970–2003 (GPPP) and 10 Asian 
countries were studied. 
Using 1970–2002 Asian data of 9 economies and 1979–1998 EMU data as benchmark, Huang 
and Guo (2006) also found Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand to be viable candidates. A four-variable SVAR model was developed to extract 
external supply, domestic supply, demand, and monetary shocks. Degree of labor mobility 
and extent of intra-trade were also reviewed.  
Sato and Zhang (2006) employed 1978–2004 Asian data and 1980–1997 EMU data as 
benchmark to assess real output co-movements of 8 Asian economies with cointegration test. 
The analysis also employed Vahid test to examine for long-run relationships and Engle tests to 
check for short-run interactions in real outputs. Short-run common business cycles were found 
in Southeast region of (1) Singapore-Thailand-Indonesia, and in the Northeast region 
consisting of (2) Hong Kong-Korea-China, as well as between (3) Japan and Taiwan. Although 
the underlying structural shocks were less symmetric and the average size of the shocks was 
larger, the speed of adjustment to shocks in East Asia was much faster than in the EU. 
Based on fuzzy cluster analysis, Nguyen (2007) detected a divergence in the post-crisis East 
Asia and from 10 economies considered, the only grouping that weathered all the periods was 
Singapore-Malaysia. The criteria used are: synchronization of business cycles, volatility of real 
exchange rate, degree of openness to regional trade, inflation differential from the regional 
average, and level of export diversification. No reference country is assigned. The analysis 
used a dataset of four overlapping periods: 1990–1996, 1990–2000, 1999–2003, and 1990–2003.  
By investigating the intra-regional interdependencies, Rana (2007) has also found increasing 
prospects for monetary union. The paper provided simple 10-year moving correlations 
between real GDP growth of 11 Asian countries and the group as a whole from 1989 to 2005. 
Correlations had been converging towards very high levels in (1) the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand. They were, however, a bit lower in (2) Laos, China, 
Singapore, and Vietnam.  
Bacha (2008) examined the feasibility of an OCA for 12 East Asian economies based on 
SVAR and correlation analysis. Time period used is 1970–2003. For the SVAR analysis, the 
paper examined the interrelationship among the real GDP growth rates and countries’ 
response to external shocks, represented by world real GDP. For the correlation analysis, the 
study looked into similarity of inflation, trade relationships, similarity in business cycles, 
and extent of policy congruence. The results indicated four potential country pairs: (1) 
Malaysia-Singapore, (2) Japan-Korea, (3) Indonesia-Thailand, and (4) Australia-New 
Zealand. It was postulated that geographic proximity could have enhanced trade intensity 
and factor mobility, enforcing the measures used. 
                                                                                                                            
that determine real exchange rates are nonstationary. A system of nonstationary real exchange rates may 
have a long-run equilibrium path in common since the individual nations will experience a set of common 
real macroeconomic shocks. This is termed as GPPP hypothesis. 
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Ibrahim (2008) utilized both hierarchical and fuzzy clustering methods on 7 East Asian 
countries using OCA criteria and ‘adjusted’ Maastricht Treaty criteria to identify for 
potential groups. Results from pre-crisis (1991–1997) and post-crisis (1998–2004) periods are 
compared. Japan is set as the reference country. The OCA criteria used are volatility in real 
GDP, volatility in real exchange rate, volatility in interest rate, trade openness, and 
convergence of inflation. The adjusted Maastricht criteria are budget deficit/GDP, external 
debt/GDP, exchange rate volatility, inflation differential, and annual prime lending rate. 
Results for pre-crisis period indicated groupings of Indonesia-Philippines and Malaysia-
Thailand-Korea. Meanwhile, post-crisis OCA results suggested groupings of Malaysia-
Philippines-Thailand-Korea whereas post-crisis Maastricht results indicated groupings of 
Malaysia-Philippines-Thailand and Singapore-Korea-China. 
Another support came from a multi-faceted study by Kawai (2008) who reviewed various 
aspects of economic integration in East Asia. The author looked at how rapidly and deeply 
regional integration has been proceeding in trade, FDI, and other activities; presented the 
evolution of exchange rate arrangements in the post-crisis period; explored the implications 
of a possible unwinding of global payments imbalances and surges in capital inflows; and 
posed the challenges for monetary coordination. Period studied is 1989–2003. Comparisons 
to post-euro EMU and other parts of the world are made. From 10 economies examined, 
those which were sufficiently integrated were (1) Japan-Korea, (2) China-Hong Kong, and 
(3) Singapore-Malaysia-Brunei. The author also presented a strong case for a currency 
basket as the monetary anchor in East Asia. 
More recently, Sato, Zhang, and Allen (2009) managed to identify two prospective groups, 
one comprising the US, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and the other containing 
ASEAN 5 (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia) and Japan. The 
study employed Johansen cointegration to check for long-run co-movements of real outputs. 
Data series extended from 1978 to 2006 and were seasonally adjusted using the Census X-12 
method. 10 Asian countries were selected. Notably, China was not a potential member with 
any of the grouped economies. More interestingly, the ASEAN countries were associated 
only when Japan was included.   
Quah (2009) compared the values of the OCA dimensions, namely inflation convergence, 
export diversification, labor market flexibility, and external indebtedness of 17 Asian 
economies to the EMU and dollarized countries in an attempt to draw patterns in the data 
which are consistent with those in the benchmark countries. The anchor currency used is the 
US dollar. Dataset was segmented into 1980–1996, 1997–2000, and 2001–2007, which contain 
post-euroization and post-dollarization periods. Results suggested that inflation rates and 
levels of export diversification in Asia were comparable to those in dollarized economies; 
labor markets in the region were at least as flexible as those in EMU; external debt levels in 
Asia have fallen considerably in comparison to the dollarized countries, indicating reduced 
incentive to fix exchange rates to the dollar; and the most prospective countries for a dollar 
bloc were India, Thailand, and Malaysia. 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
Some generalizations can be made from the review. First, though the empirical papers have 
used different methods, some common ‘groupings’ can still be found in many of the results.  
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Based on pre-1997-dataset results, two general groupings can be recognized: the Northeast 
Japan-Korea-Taiwan group and the Southeast Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia 
group. The pre-crisis (growth period) data appear to have generated groupings by level of 
economic development; the more developed Northeast group and the less developed 
Southeast group. 
For those using pre-2000 datasets, the “Asian Tigers” Taiwan-Hong Kong-Singapore group, 
the ‘crisis’ Korea-Thailand group, and the Southeast Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia group 
can be detected. Obviously, the dataset which encompasses the pre-crisis and the crisis 
period has produced the Asian Tigers group which has been robust during the crisis period, 
the crisis group which has been severely distressed, and the Southeast group which has 
been relatively less affected. 
When pre-2008 datasets are utilized, an ‘extended Southeast’ Korea-Philippines-Thailand-
Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia grouping can be commonly found. It is apparent that this 
group represents the countries which have been substantially severed during the crisis but 
have since rebounded significantly. 
Despite the variations in the groupings, the original ASEAN members, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have appeared to be consistently indicated as 
prospective countries. With the expected benefits and the substantially flexible labor in these 
markets, there is a strong case for a monetary bloc centered on a stable anchor such as the 
dollar in ASEAN. 
Nonetheless, this finding is not highly conclusive since selection bias could have contributed 
to the results. The fact that the number of countries included differs from one study to 
another study does indicate that the sampled cases are varied. Among the studies reviewed, 
relevant Asian economies such as India, Vietnam, Macau, and Brunei have almost been 
neglected 
Some motivation could be behind this. In selecting the countries to examine, aside from 
data constraints, the authors could have been influenced by the notion that flexible 
exchange rates are detrimental to highly open (small) economies. Hence, only highly open 
Asian economies such as ASEAN 5, Japan, Korea, etc., are given much importance. What 
remains to be unclear, however, is the non-inclusion of Brunei in almost all the studies 
even though Brunei is a highly open small economy with total trade more than its GDP 
(see Kawai and Takagi, 2005). Of course Macau is also a highly open small economy. If 
Hong Kong, a China’s territory, can be treated as a separate entity in the studies, so does 
Macau.  
Nevertheless, the authors could have also been adhering to another facet of the traditional 
theory when selecting the countries. Consider this:  
If a prevailing exchange rate regime, fixed or flexible, can maintain external balance 
without causing unemployment (or demand-induced wage inflation), that regime is 
optimal. If the currency regime within a given area causes unemployment somewhere 
in that area (or compels some other portion of that same area to accept inflation as the 
antidote to unemployment), it is not optimal.  
(Kenen, 1969, p. 41). 
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The excerpt above is an interpretation given by Peter Kenen on the definition of optimality 
implied by Mundell (1961). Hence, if an Asian country has already achieved those objectives 
with existing exchange regime, moving into a monetary union is not necessary. This might 
also be a reason why some countries are consistently not examined in the studies. But then 
again, the reasons for including certain countries and not including the others are rarely 
made clear in the empirical works. Along these lines, it is not totally unfounded to 
conjecture that early theoretical views might have been overshadowed by current 
considerations14, such as the case for monetary union and most importantly the need to 
demonstrate the rigor in the methodology involved. 
Secondly, while the early intellectual debate has been spurred by the fact that homogenous 
regions or countries hardly prevail and hence adjusting mechanisms such as factor mobility, 
product diversification, flexible exchange rates, etc., are needed to achieve the objectives of 
price stability, full employment, and external balance, the empirical OCA literature appears 
to have always been in the search for homogeneous economic regions, made up of 
economies which share common macroeconomic circumstances (output variations, real 
exchange rate movements, etc.) in an attempt to identify potential candidates for monetary 
union. There seems to be a consensus among the empirics that sufficiently symmetrical 
countries can be identified in Asia so that adjustment mechanisms may be less needed if a 
common monetary standard is implemented across the countries. Along these lines, the 
current empirical literature could be regarded as the other side of the coin to the early 
theoretical debate.  
Thirdly, those studies which used EMU as a metric for East Asia (e.g. Huang and Guo, 
2006; Sato and Zhang, 2006) can be commended for bringing the theoretical grounds of 
OCA closer to pragmatic circumstances, given that statistical significance alone still leaves 
much to be desired. Nonetheless, the validity of the results could have been greatly 
enhanced if measures from the post-euro EMU are used in the comparative analyses 
between Asia and EMU, hence, mitigating the criticism from the endogeneity of OCA 
criteria argument (see Frankel and Rose, 1998). Suppose OCA criteria are indeed 
endogenous, that is, achieved only after monetary union is formed, using post-euro 
benchmarks would be much more appropriate than using pre-euro benchmarks. In this 
respect, studies done after euroization, those which used post-1999 Asian data (e.g. 
Huang and Guo, 2006; Sato and Zhang, 2006) have obvious advantage of using the post-
euro data. Among the papers reviewed, however, perhaps due to insufficient post-euro 
data for econometric modeling, only Rana (2007), Kawai (2008), and Quah (2009) have 
demonstrated this in a descriptive manner. But then again, no due emphasis has been 
given to the endogeneity argument. Hence, it is not unreasonable to say that little has 
been done in view of the endogeneity criticism. 
Lastly, notwithstanding the obvious case for the dollar as the monetary anchor for East 
Asia, it has nevertheless gained little attention among the empirics. Perhaps due to the 
ambiguity of a center economy in Asia (unlike in EU where Germany is commonly 
                                                 
14 For instance, Font-Vilalta and Costa-Font (2006) selected the set of countries according to availability 
of data and affiliation to the Japanese economy. Clearly it is not based on whether the existing 
arrangement is not optimal or otherwise.  
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accepted as the center economy), a monetary anchor is rarely set a priori in the empirical 
studies. 
In conclusion, this paper has concisely discussed the essence of the early theoretical 
foundations of OCAs; highlighted more recent developments such as why monetary 
union anchored on a stable currency would not only be favorable but also feasible for East 
Asia; presented the case for US dollar and the case for a currency basket as the monetary 
anchor; reviewed a substantial number of current empirical papers on Asian OCA; and 
made some interpretations in view of the early conceptual principles and the current 
empirical works.  
Unquestionably, the conclusions made here are limited in the sense that only 20 empirical 
papers published in 1994-2009 have been reviewed which certainly do not represent the 
studies in the field at large. 
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